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Abstract
This paper presents firm-level evidence on the dynamics of the rel-
ative demand for non-manual workers in Italian manufacturing dur-
ing the 1990s. The analysis provides a number of interesting results.
First, the rise within firms in the share of non manual workers in
both employment and hours worked (within-firm skill upgrading) is
the main determinant of the increase in the relative demand for skilled
workers. By contrast, demand changes associated to trade have mit-
igated such a rise by shifting employment away from skill-intensive
firms. Second, while the relative number of hours worked by skilled
workers within firms has risen, the hourly wage premium has fallen.
Third, within-firm skill upgrading is strongly and significantly related
to investment in computers and R&D. Fourth, we find that technical
progress has raised the relative productivity of skilled workers (the
skill-bias of technical progress is positive). Finally we show that the
standard approach that measures annual, rather than hourly relative
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wages, produces a downward bias in the estimate of the skill-bias of
technical progress.
JEL Classification: F1, F16, J31, O3
Keywords: wage differentials, skill bias, technical progress, global-
ization.
1 Introduction
Once upon a time, before the era of portable computers and cellular phones,
commuters on the Milan-Rome train route broadly fell into two categories:
first class travellers, mainly business people and academics, usually spending
their time reading the financial and general press, or taking naps (the latter);
economy class travellers, mainly families, young people and tourists, often
involved in animated conversations with fellow travellers, typically about soc-
cer or politics. Nowadays, first-class travellers can be seen silently hunched
over their laptops, or heard noisily talking business over their cellular phones.
Most second-class travellers still chat their way to their destination, although
now over cellular phones, and some watch DVD’s on their lap-tops. Aca-
demics, now travelling in economy class, either read newspapers or work on
their laptops (or take naps).1
This anecdotal evidence suggests three working hypotheses: 1. technical
progress in Italy, as in many other countries, has been skill-biased, that is,
it has raised the relative productivity of more educated workers (first-class
travellers presumably make a more productive use of personal computers) as
well as the relative number of hours worked by skilled workers (first class
travellers now work instead of relaxing); 2. relative wages in Italy have
not (fully) adjusted to the change in relative productivity and hours (as a
consequence, academics can lo longer afford to travel – and take naps – in first
class); 3. possibly as a result, firms have considerably raised the proportion
of non-manual workers in employment.
This paper explores these conjectures by investigating the dynamics of
manual and non-manual employment and wages in Italian manufacturing
during the 1990s. We present firm-level evidence on the sources and deter-
minants of the increase in the demand for non-manual workers, based on a
new data set, previously unavailable for research, that covers a large panel of
1We are grateful to Giorgio Basevi for this example.
2
manufacturing firms between 1989 and 1995. The analysis provides a number
of results supporting these conjectures.
First, Italian firms have substituted unskilled for skilled workers at a rate
comparable to those experienced in other industrialized countries, with high-
tech firms playing a leading role in this process (within-firm skill upgrading
is the main determinant of the shift in relative labor demand in the nineties).
Second, the relative stability of annual wage differentials within firms hides
an important composition effect : at firm level the relative number of hours
worked by skilled workers has risen, whereas relative hourly wages have fallen.
Thus substitution toward skills has occurred not only in terms of employment
but also in terms of hours worked. By contrast, demand changes associated to
trade have moved employment away from skill-intensive firms, contributing
to moderate the change in relative factor prices: between-firm employment
shifts have reduced the relative demand for skills. Third, within-firm skill
upgrading, measured by changes in both relative employment and number of
hours, is strongly and significantly related to investment in computers and
R&D. Fourth, we find that technical progress has significantly raised the
relative productivity of skilled workers (we estimate a positive skill-bias of
technical progress). Finally, we show that the conventional approach that
measures annual, rather than hourly relative wages, produces a downward
bias in the estimate of the skill-bias of technical progress. The reason is
that changes in relative hours worked are incorrectly attributed to changes
in factor prices rather than quantities.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the theoret-
ical background of the analysis and relates the present work to the literature.
Section 3 provides a description of the data set and presents some stylized
facts of wage and employment dynamics in Italy in the last decade. In section
4 we present a decomposition of the aggregate changes in the relative wage
bill, employment and wages, into their respective within-firm and between-
firm components. Section 5 takes a closer look at the behavior of wages,
and shows the implications of disaggregating annual wages into the num-
ber of hours worked and hourly wages. In section 6 we present evidence
from firm-level regressions to provide an interpretation of the observed wage
and employment dynamics, and section 7 focuses on the bias of skill-biased
technical change. Section 8 concludes with a discussion of the main results.
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2 Technology, trade and wages
In the last two decades labor markets in OECD countries have witnessed a
significant change in the structure of employment and wages for skilled and
unskilled workers. In the United States and the United Kingdom, both the
share of non-manual employment and the wage differential between manual
and non-manual workers have grown considerably since the early 1980s.2
In continental Europe, wage differentials have been stable, and most of the
adjustment has taken place on the quantity side, with rising non-manual
workers’ employment rates and manual workers’ unemployment rates.3 The
conventional wisdom for Europe is that the lack of adjustment in relative
wages is due to more rigid labor market institutions (minimum wages, hiring
and firing costs, centralized bargaining and union power, etc.), with unem-
ployment rates adjusting to the falling demand for unskilled workers.
A large body of literature has attempted to provide an interpretation of
these developments,4 with most studies concentrating on the determinants
of the relative demand for skilled labor.5 In particular, trade integration and
technological change have been considered the main factors behind the rise
in demand for skilled workers.6 The “technology” view argues that technical
progress has been skill-biased : new production practices associated to the
introduction of computers have increased the relative productivity of skilled
workers. This has led to higher relative demand, and in turn to higher
employment share and wage premia for skilled workers. Empirically, skill-
biased technical change is consistent with increased employment shares of
skilled labor within individual sectors (or firms/plants, depending on the
2See e.g. Katz and Murphy (1992)), Bound and Johnson (1992), Lawrence and Slaugh-
ter (1993), Berman, Bound, and Griliches (1994)) for the United States, and Haskel (1998),
Haskel and Slaughter (2001b)) for the United Kingdom.
3See e.g. Freeman and Katz (1996), OECD (1997), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998),
Machin and Van Reenen (1998), Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1998).
4For recent surveys of this literature see Haskel (2000) and Slaughter (1999).
5As for supply, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that lower relative supply of skills could
account only for a small part of the observed changes in relative wages in the United
States between 1963 and 1987. See also Topel (1997) for an analysis of the supply-side
determinants of wage inequality.
6Other expanations often proposed are outsorcing (see e.g. Haskel (1996), Feenstra and
Hanson (1999)), and changes in institutional factors such as the decline of the influence
of unions, collective bargaining, and lower minimum wages (see e.g. Gosling and Machin
(1993) and Fortin and Lemieux (1997)).
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level of aggregation and the specific way new technologies are adopted). The
“trade” view points to Stolper-Samuelson effects of increased exposure to
international trade.7 According to advocates of this explanation, competition
from developing countries has lowered the relative price of unskilled-intensive
goods. As resources have shifted to sectors producing more profitable skill-
intensive products, the relative demand for manual workers has fallen. This
argument thus “blames” the growth of trade in goods, services and factors
in the past three decades (i.e. “globalization”). Empirically, the trade view
is consistent with employment moving from skill-unintensive towards skill-
intensive sectors (firms or plants).
The broad consensus emerging from the early empirical literature, gen-
erally based on studies of industry data, is that, while international trade
accounts for no more than 15-20% of the rise in wage differentials, the rest
can be explained by skill-biased technical progress (see e.g. Bound and John-
son (1992) and Berman et al. (1994) for the United States, but also Berman
et al. (1998) and Machin and Van Reenen (1998) for an international per-
spective).8 This conclusion is supported by two main findings. First, most
of the aggregate skill upgrading is due to changes within industries, whereas
the reallocation of employment between industries plays a smaller role. Sec-
ond, within-industry skill upgrading is significantly related to a number of
indicators of technological change.
This explanation has been recently challenged, both empirically and the-
oretically. At the empirical level, a number of studies based on firm- or
plant-level data reach conclusions significantly different from those obtained
on the basis of industry data.9 Bernard and Jensen (1997), for example,
find that within-industry increases in the demand for skilled labor can be
largely attributed to shifts in employment between plants of the same indus-
try (see also Bernard and Jensen (1995)), with exporting plants playing a
major role.10 Earlier studies, it is argued, have ignored important dynam-
7See Richardson (1995), Wood (1995) and Slaughter (1998) for recent surveys on the
effects of trade on wage dynamics.
8A similar conclusion has been reached using both price (e.g. Leamer (1996), Feenstra
and Hanson (1996)) and volume (e.g., Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997)) data to capture
the effect of trade on the labor market.
9Most plant- and firm-level analyses aim at assessing the links between exporting ac-
tivity and productivity (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al. (2000))
or the existence of learning effects associated with the exports status of firms (see e.g.
Clarides, Lauch and Tybout (1998)).
10For a theoretical explanation of this evidence see Manasse and Turrini (2001).
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ics occurring at the level of individual firms and establishments, and thus
have largely underestimated the role of demand and trade. At the theoret-
ical level, trade theorists have argued that what matters for factor prices
(in a two-sector two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin economy) is the sector in which
technical progress occurs, rather than its factor bias (see e.g. Leamer (1994,
1998)).11
There are relatively few studies on the Italian case. Most of the exist-
ing evidence for Italy is based on industry-level data. Bella and Quintieri
(2000) analyze a panel of manufacturing industries, and argue that trade
competition has had a small impact on employment changes, whereas tech-
nological progress has played a major role. Faini et al. (1999) reach similar
conclusions on the limited role of trade for labor market dynamics, using
a panel of fourteen manufacturing sectors between 1985 and 1995. Among
firm-level studies, Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (1994) look at a cross section of
metal-mechanical firms to discuss the role of trade unions in affecting wage
differentials.12 Casavola et al. (1996) consider a large panel of firms be-
tween 1986 and 1990, finding that technological change explains most of the
increase in relative employment. More recently, Manasse et al. (2001) an-
alyze a panel of metal-mechanical firms and find that skill-biased technical
change is the main determinant of skill upgrading, raising wage inequality
within skilled workers (i.e. between managers and clerks) more than between
manual and non-manual workers.13
Against this background, our paper contributes to the literature in several
respects: data, methodology and, we think, results. As to the first aspect,
we exploit a new and much more comprehensive data set for Italy, filling
an important gap for assessing the role of technology and trade for this
country; as to methodology, we provide a general and consistent approach to
11Krugman (1995), however, shows that this criticism rests on the assumption of local
technical change affecting a small open economy. See Haskel (2000) for an interpretation
of this debate, and Haskel and Slaughter (2001a) for empirical evidence on the role of
sector bias for the dynamics of wage differentials.
12Erickson and Ichino (1995) and Dell’Aringa and Lucifora (2000) discuss the role of
labor market institutions in explaining a compressed wage structure in Italy. Ferragina
and Quintieri (1998) examine the relationship between export activity, productivity and
performance. See also Quintieri and Rosati (1995) for an investigation of inter-industry
wage differentials.
13This study also finds that trade has dampened the effects of technology on the labor
market, as employment has shifted towards unskilled-intensive firms (see also Faini et al.
(1999)).
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firm-level between/within decompositions; moreover, we show how previous
estimates of the role of technical progress may contain a “bias of the bias”, by
attributing changes in relative hours to factor prices rather than quantities.
3 The data
Our analysis is based on firm-level data for the Italian manufacturing sector.
The data set is drawn from the Statistical Information System on Enter-
prises (SISSI), developed by the Italian Statistical Institute (ISTAT, Central
Directorate of Statistics on Institutions and Enterprises), and it combines in-
formation from four sources: the System of Accounts of Firms (SCI) and the
Survey on Technological Innovation of Industrial Enterprises (INN), both
collected on a yearly basis; the monthly statistics on Foreign Trade Flows
(COE), and the Archives of Active Firms (ASIA, SIRIO, NAI).14
The data set provides information on the profit and loss account (sales,
output, costs and outlays, value added, labor costs, capital depreciation and
allowances, interests on debts, taxes, profits, etc.), the asset and liabilities
account (real assets, financial assets and liabilities, financial and commer-
cial credits and debits, etc.), firms’ employment and wages, fixed capital
formation, R&D and exports. Our sample consists of a balanced panel of
8441 manufacturing firms, covering about 22 per cent of total manufacturing
employment, with annual observations from 1989 to 1995. Data on employ-
ment and wages are available separately for manual workers (trainees and
production workers) and non-manual workers (clerks and executives).15 The
majority of firms in the sample (63%) falls into the category of “medium”
firms (between 25 and 100 employees), while 23% are “large” (more than 100
employees) and the remaining 14% are “small” (below 25 employees). As for
the geographic distribution, 80% of the firms in the sample are located in
Northern Italy, 15.5% in Central Italy and the remaining 4.5% in the South.16
Table 1 provides a preliminary description of the data, reporting sample
14See Sorce and Fazio (1999) and Corsini, Di Francescantonio and Monducci (1998) for
a more detailed description of the construction of the data set.
15Wages include salaries, social contributions paid by the firm, and contributions paid
by the firm to the severance-payment fund (TFR).
16The three geographic areas are defined as follows. North: Piemonte, Valle D’Aosta,
Lombardia, Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna. Center:
Toscana, Umbria, Lazio, Marche, Abruzzo, Molise. South: Campania, Basilicata, Puglia,
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
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and (appropriately defined) sub-sample averages for a number of wage and
employment indicators. Column 1 shows the share of non-manual workers in
the wage bill (WBn
WB
), while columns 2 and 3 display its components: the ratio
of the wage rate of non-manual workers over the average wage (Wn
W
, henceforth
“skill premium”), and the share of non-manual workers in employment (En
E
,
henceforth “skill intensity”). In the period 1989-1995, on average, the share
of non-manual workers in the wage bill was 43.3 per cent, the skill premium
135.9 per cent, and skill intensity 31.8 per cent. Table 1 also reports, in
columns 4 and 5, the average annual wage rate of non-manual and average
workers (Wn = 68.2 and W = 50.2 millions Italian lira, respectively); and,
in columns 6 and 7, the number of non-manual and total employees in the
sample (En = 43.3 and E = 136 thousands, respectively).
Between 1989 and 1995 the share of non-manual workers in the wage
bill rose by 3.5 percentage points (0.58 per cent a year, on average). This
reflected a significant increase in skill intensity (2.4 per cent), with a relatively
modest 0.8 per cent rise in the skill premium. Hence, relative wages in our
sample conform to the “sticky” pattern found in other studies for earlier
periods (e.g. Erickson, Ichino (1995)). The rise in skill-intensity, in turn,
reflected an absolute increase of average non-manual employment (from 41.6
to 43.4 thousands) despite the contraction, from 137.8 to 133.2 thousands,
of total employment (note that this implies that manual employment fell by
6.4 thousand units in our sample of firms).
The following blocks in Table 1 document the significant heterogeneity of
firms in the sample as far as wages and employment are concerned. Grouping
firms according to their size, larger firms pay substantially higher nominal
wages than small and medium firms. Skill premia are highest in medium-
size firms (134.7 per cent) and lowest in small firms (128.5 per cent), while
the wage bill share and skill intensity are increasing in size. Considering a
classification based on the geographic distribution, firms located in the South
are on average smaller (119.5 employees) and pay substantially lower wages
than those in the rest of the country. Also, they appear to pay higher skill
premia (140.2%) than those in the rest of the country, although they are
characterized by lower wage bill shares (36%) and skill intensity (25.7%).
Next, we consider two further classifications, according to their export
activity and computer intensity. “High-export” (“low-export”) firms are de-
fined as those whose share of exports in total sales is above (below) the
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median.17 Similarly, “high-technology” (“low-technology”) firms are defined
as those whose share of computer stock over total capital stock is above (be-
low) the median18. “High” and ”low” exporters pay similar wages and have
similar wage bill shares and skill intensity (despite the former being larger).
“Technology-intensive” firms (henceforth “high-tech”) employ a substantially
higher proportion of skilled workers (35.4% against 27.2%). Despite paying
higher salaries for both types of workers, the wage differentials are surpris-
ingly lower in high-techs. The share of skilled worker in the wage bill is
about 10 percentage points higher than low-tech firms.
Table 2 groups high/low-tech firms and high/low-export firms by size,
since some of the features previously observed may be simply due to differ-
ences in scale. The figures suggest that the features of high-tech firms do
not depend on their size: high-tech firms are more skill-intensive, pay lower
premia, and have higher non-manual wage bill share than low-tech firms in
all size groups. On the other hand, the similarities between high- and low-
exporters in the total sample turn out to be a fallacy of composition: small
and medium high-exporters are more skill intensive and pay lower skill pre-
mia than low-exporters of the same size, while the converse is true for large
high-exporters.
4 Firm-Level Decompositions
In this section we present firm-level decompositions in order to provide an in-
terpretation of the aggregate annual wage and employment changes described
above. We decompose the change in the relative wage bill into the respective
contributions of employment skill-intensity and wage skill-premium. Each of
these is further disaggregated into a between and a within component. The
former reflects reallocations of employment and wages that occur between
different firms, and presumably reflect demand shifts; the latter identifies
changes in the employment and wage structure that occur within individ-
ual firms, and possibly reflect technical change. We depart here from the
literature in an important aspect: instead of focusing on the decomposi-
tions for the relative wage bill and employment intensity taken in isolation
(see e.g. Berman et al., (1994), Bernard and Jensen (1997), Berman et al.
(1998), Machin and Van Reenen (1998)) we proceed by nesting the wage bill
17Due to data limitations, the ratio of exports to total sales is only available for 1989.
18Thus this classification is based firms’ inputs, rather than on their output.
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with employment and wage decompositions. Unlike the standard approach,
our methodology allows us to identify the respective contributions of annual
wages and employment to the change in the wage bill share. Moreover, our
approach provides explicit information on the changes of relative wages (see
also Manasse et al., 2001).
Let the firms in the sample be indexed by superscript i = 1, ..., I, and
denote manual and non-manual workers with subscripts m and n, respectively
(so that Ein and W
i
n denote non-manual employment and wage in firm i).
Firm i employs Ei = Ein + E
i
m workers. Total employment is E =
∑
i E
i,
and total non-manual employment is En =
∑
i E
i
n. The average wage at the
firm is defined as W i = W
i
nE
i
n+W
i
mE
i
m
Ein+E
i
m
= WB
i
Ei
and the non-manual wage at
the firm is defined as W in =
W inE
i
n
Ein
= WB
i
n
Ein
. Finally, let W =
∑
i
W iEi∑
i
Ei
= WB
E
and Wn =
∑
i
W inE
i
n∑
i
Ein
= WBn
En
denote the (sample-wide) average mean wage and
mean non-manual wage, respectively.
The change in the share of non-manual workers in the wage bill can be
decomposed as follows:
∆(
WBn
WB
) = ∆
I∑
i
(
W in
W
Ein
E
)
=
I∑
i=1

∆ (W in
W
)(
Ein
E
)
Wtot
+ ∆
(
Ein
E
)(
W in
W
)
Etot


(1)
where ∆ denotes time difference and the upper bar denotes an average over
time. The first term in the square brackets in (1) is the sum of changes in wage
premia, weighted by the time-average share of non-manuals in employment
(Wtot). The second term is the sum of changes in skill intensities, weighted
by the corresponding time-average of wage premia (Etot).
Consider first the employment component (Etot). This may rise for two
reasons: either individual firms have, on average, become more skill-intensive
(within effect), or employment has shifted towards firms that are relatively
intensive of skilled workers (between effect). Similarly, for the wage compo-
nent (Wtot) higher wage premia may be due either to the fact that individual
firms have, on average, paid higher skill premia (within effect), or to the fact
that average wages have grown more rapidly in firms paying relatively higher
premia (between effect). In order to disentangle these different sources, we
decompose the two terms in equation (1) into their respective between and
within components.
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The (weighted) employment component can be written as follows:
I∑
i
∆
(
Ein
E
)(
W in
W
)
Etot
=
I∑
i
[
∆P inS
i
Ewit
+ ∆SiP in
Ebet
] (
W in
W
)
(2)
where P in =
Ein
Ei
is the proportion of skilled workers in firm i’ s employment,
and Si = E
i
E
is the share of firm i in total employment. The first term in
square brackets represents the change in the non-manual employment share
that can be attributed to changes in firms’ factor proportions, P in , keeping
constant their relative size, Si. This reflects shifts in factor intensity within
firms (henceforth denoted with Ewit): if positive, it suggests that on average
firms have substituted unskilled with skilled workers. The second term gives
the part of the total change that can be attributed to the change in firms’
employment share or relative size, Si, keeping each firm’s factor propor-
tions constant. This reflects movements of employment between firms (and
is denoted by Ebet): if positive, it suggests that employment has shifted, on
average, towards skill-intensive firms.
Similarly, the (weighted) wage component can be disaggregated as follows:
I∑
i
∆
(
W in
W
)(
Ein
E
)
Wtot
=
∑
i
[
∆DinR
i
Wwit
+ ∆RiDin
Wbet
](
Ein
E
)
(3)
where Din =
W in
W i
is the wage differential paid by firm i, and Ri = W
i
W
is the
relative wage paid by firm i as a ratio of the average (sample-wide) wage
rate. The first term in square brackets is the part that can be attributed to
changes in firms’ wage differentials, Din, keeping constant their relative wages,
Ri. This is the wage-within component (Wwit): if positive, it suggests that
on average firms have raised skill premia. The second term accounts for the
changes in firms’ relative wage rates, keeping their wage premia constant.
This is the between component (Wbet): it is positive if, on average, wages
have risen faster in firms that pay higher premia.
Summing up, within-firm movements presumably reflect factor -specific
shocks, such as changes in the relative factor productivity and/or wage pre-
mia, due to skill-biased technical progress. Between movements presumably
reflect firm and sector -specific shocks, such as changes in domestic and for-
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eign demand affecting market shares and/or average wage rates.19
Table 3 presents the results of the decompositions in equations (1-3): the
average annual change of the share of non manual workers in the wage bill
(WBtot), and the contributions of the change in skill intensity (Etot) and the
change in skill premium (Wtot), split further into their respective between
and within contributions (Ebet, Ewit, Wbet, Wwit). The first row displays
the results for the overall sample of firms.20 Between 1989 and 1995 the
share of non manual workers in the wage bill rises on average by 0.58 per
cent a year. This is largely accounted for by the skill intensity component
(Etot = 0.51 per cent), with a smaller contribution of the wage premium
component (Wtot = 0.07 per cent). Interestingly, the rise in the proportion of
skilled workers in employment is due to substantial within-firm substitution
of unskilled with skilled labor (Ewit = 0.63 per cent a year), whereas the
between component is negative (Ebet = −0.12 per cent), partially offsetting
the effect of the within component.
This means that, on average, employment has moved towards unskilled -
intensive firms, thus moderating the rise in the proportion of skilled workers
in employment.21 Looking at the wage components, most of the (very small)
total change can be attributed to the between effect (Wbet = 0.06 per cent):
on average wages have risen somewhat faster in firms paying higher skill
premia.
Rows 2 and 3 of table 3 divide the 1989-95 sample into two four-year sub-
periods (1989-92 and 1992-95). The results indicate that, for both relative
employment and wages, changes were much larger in the first sub-period:
the share of non-manual workers in the wage bill rose at an average annual
rate of 1 per cent between 1989 and 1992, as opposed to just 0.17 per cent
between 1992 and 1995. It is interesting to observe that this deceleration
is largely explained by the employment component. In particular, the rela-
tive expansion of employment in unskilled -intensive firms (the negative Ebet)
occurs only in the second sub-period, 1992-95, a period of booming manufac-
turing exports, particularly for low skill intensive firms, spurred by a rapidly
depreciating real exchange rate (see Manasse et al. (2002)). In the same
19Clearly, demand and trade may indirectly affect within-firm changes through their
impact on factor prices (see below).
20Note that the lower number of observations (compared to table 1) is due to the presence
of firms employing only manual workers.
21This result confirms the findings in Manasse et al. (2001) for the metal-mechanical
sector. See also Faini et al. (1999) for similar results based on industry data for Italy.
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period skill-upgrading (the positive Ewit) also slows down.
The next blocks in table 3 show the contributions of individual sub-
samples of firms to the overall decomposition. Looking at the classification
of firms by their computer-intensity, two interesting features appear from the
table. First, high-tech firms account for a large share of the rise of skill in-
tensity within firm (Ewit about 0.40 per cent as opposed to 0.24 per cent for
low-tech firms). This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that new tech-
nologies (computers) and skills are complement, so that technical change has
indeed been skilled-biased. Second, high-tech firms also entirely account for
the negative employment between component, Ebet. Thus high tech firms,
the most active in raising their skill intensity, have lost market shares during
this period. Looking at the classification of firms by their export activity, we
observe an important result: high-export firms account entirely for the nega-
tive employment between component. The last two findings suggest that the
Italian specialization pattern in international trade is shifting employment
towards unskilled-intensive goods and away from computer-intensive firms.22
Notice also that, when we classify firms jointly for computer-intensity and
export-activity, skill-upgrading (Ewit) occurs equally for all high-tech firms
(irrespective of being high or low exporters), whereas the loss of employment
share (Ebet) is more evident among high-tech exporters.
5 Hours and hourly wages
In this section we examine our “working on the train” conjecture that tech-
nical progress affects on the relative number of hours worked by non manual
workers. The point here is that considering annual rather than hourly wages,
that is lumping together the number of hours with the hourly wage rate,
as generally done in the literature, is potentially misleading. When hours
change, this erroneously shows up in factor prices (annual wages) rather than
in factor quantities (total hours employed). Thus the previous decomposi-
tions may be misleading, and estimates of the skill-bias of technical progress
(see below) may be biased.
We obtain the average number of hours worked per employee in firm i (hi)
22It should be noted that the negative employment between component is largely at-
tributable to large firms (-0.13 per cent). Within these firms, high-exporters are indeed
less skill intensive than low-exporters (relative skilled employment is 33.5 and 36.4, re-
spectively).
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by dividing the number of hours worked in firm i (H i) by the number of its
employees (Ei): hi = H
i
Ei
. The hourly average wage at the firm is then defined
as the ratio between the annual wage rate and the average number of hours
per employee: ωi = W
i
hi
. The average non-manual hours and hourly wage
rates at firm i, hin, ω
i
n are calculated similarly.
Table 4 shows sample and sub-sample means across firms for average
worker’s and non-manual worker’s hours (h and hn, respectively), hourly
wage rates (ω and ωn), and the corresponding “hourly” skill intensity (
hn
h
)
and wage premium (ωn
ω
). In the entire sample, non manual employees work
longer hours per year (1720.6 vs. 1665.2), and earn higher hourly wages
than average workers (39.6 vs. 30.1 thousand lire per hour, corresponding
to Euro 20.45 and 15.6 respectively). The average hourly skill premium and
hourly intensity are thus 131.5 and 103.3 per cent, respectively. Looking
back at Table 1, we see that in the total wage premium of 135,9 (first row,
second column), only 131,5 (Table 4) is the actual price differential, the rest
simply reflecting differences in hours. Looking at changes between 1989 and
1995, the hourly wage premium rises by 1.2 percentage points, while hourly
skill intensity rises until 1993 and then falls back to just below the initial
level. Comparing this with the change in relative annual wages (Wn
W
), Table
1 second column, we see that the modest rise in relative annual wages is
(more than) entirely due to the rise in the hourly premium (ωn
ω
). The hourly
wage premium is smaller in high-tech and high-export firms, while hourly
skill intensity is relatively more uniform across firms.
Proceeding as before, we aim at separating the (between) changes result-
ing from compositional effects from those occurring at firm level (within).
Thus we calculate between/within decompositions for the three components
of the relative wage bill (see Appendix for details), employment (E), hours
worked (H) and hourly wages (HW ):
∆(
WBn
WB
) = (Ewit + Ebet) + (Hwit + Hbet) + (HWwit + HWbet) (4)
The results, presented in Table 5, are revealing, particularly when com-
pared with those reported in Table 3 . The apparent stability of annual wage
premia within firms (Wwit = 0.01 in table 3), hides the offsetting contribu-
tions of hours and hourly wages: relative non-manual hours have risen at the
annual rate of Hwit = 0.19, while, given lack of adjustment in salaries, the
within firm hourly premium HWwit has fallen at the same rate. Given that
the relative price of an hour of skilled labor has actually declined, firms have
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substituted manual with non-manual workers not only in terms of employ-
ment levels (on the extensive margin), at the annual rate of Ewit = 0.63,
but also in terms of hours (on the intensive margin), at the annual rate of
Hwit = 0.19. The latter phenomenon is simply obscured when the stan-
dard definition of annual wages is used. Relative total non-manual hours
have therefore risen approximately at the annual rate of 0.63+ 0.19 = 0.82
which is about one third above the estimate in Table 3. We now turn to the
interpretation of these decompositions.
6 Interpreting the decompositions
So far we have interpreted the within and between components as reflecting
technology and demand shocks, respectively. This interpretation, however,
is not warranted: within-firm changes may also be due to demand shocks.
Suppose, for example, that the domestic relative price of unskilled-intensive
(“traditional”) goods rises, due to a change in preferences or to trade liberal-
ization.23 As new firms enter the “traditional” sector, the share of unskilled
workers in employment rises (between effect). The resulting excess demand
for unskilled workers lowers the wage premium, and induces firms to substi-
tute manual with non-manual workers (a positive employment within effect).
In this case, a demand shock (between firms) indirectly causes a (within firm)
change in factor proportions. Attributing the latter to technology would be
incorrect, and it would result in overestimating the role of technology (and
underestimating that of demand or trade).
In this section we therefore examine whether it is correct to interpret
within and between components as reflecting technology and demand, re-
spectively. We regress the between and within changes of wages (both annual
and hourly), employment and hours, on variables that proxy for firm-level
demand and technology shocks. If the standard interpretation is correct,
within-firm changes should be significantly related to technology but not to
demand variables, while the converse should be true for between changes.
We use the rate of growth of total sales as an indicator of the change
in demand for a firm’s output, and consider two alternative indicators of
technological change at firm-level: the ratio of investment in computers over
total investment, and the ratio of research and development expenditures over
23We thank Paolo Epifani for raising this point.
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total sales24. All the regressions include size, region, and industry dummies to
allow for different firm and industry characteristics. The general specification
is therefore:
∆C id = α + β1∆lS
i + β2ICI
i + β3RDS
i +
∑
j
γjDUMj (5)
where ∆C id indicates firm i
′s contribution to the overall change in the rel-
ative wage bill, employment and (annual and hourly) wage (∆C = WB,
E, W,HW,H), and the subscript d = bet, wit denotes between and within
components, respectively; ∆lS is the growth rate of total sales, ICI is the
ratio of the firm’s investment in computers over total investment, RDS is the
ratio of Research and Development expenditures over total sales, and DUM
represents a set of industry, size and geographic dummies.
The results of OLS estimation of equation (5), presented in table 6,
are quite revealing 25. The growth rate of sales has a positive and highly
significant coefficient in all between regressions (with the exception of the
hourly wage equation): demand shocks are positively related to between-firm
changes in both employment and annual wages, but not to within changes
(with the exception of hours, Hwit, and hourly wages, HWwit). Looking
at the technology indicators, the computer share of investment ICI is posi-
tive and significant in the wage bill and employment within equations, while
negative but never significant in the between equations. The research and
development indicator RDS is positive but only marginally significant in the
wage bill and employment within equations. Interestingly, it is positive and
strongly significant in the equation for the within firm relative number of
hours, Hwit. The results for hourly wages are less clear-cut: the within com-
ponent is significantly related to both the growth of sales (positively) and
the R&D indicator (negatively); the between component is not significantly
affected by either demand or technology indicators.
Overall, the evidence suggests that between-firm changes for all the indi-
cators examined are positively and significantly related to changes in demand.
In addition, there is a positive and significant relationship between technical
change, as measured by investment in computers and R&D intensity, and
24The R&D variable also contains expenditures for patents, concessions, and copyrights.
25The lower number of observations (from 8203 in the decompositions to 7377 in the
regressions) is largely due to data limitations on the technology indicators: only 8005 and
7830 observations, respectively, are available for the computer intensity and research and
development indicators.
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within-firm skill upgrading both on the extensive margin (number of em-
ployees) and the intensive margin (number of hours worked per employee).
7 The biased bias of technical change
In the previous sections we found that main determinant of the rise of
the non-manual employment and wage bill shares is firms substituting non-
manual for manual workers. In this section, we use a cost function frame-
work to measure effect of technical change on the relative productivity of
non-manual workers (the so called skill-bias of technical change). We find a
positive and significant skill-bias. Also, we show that the common practice
of defining relative wages in terms of annual, rather than hourly, salaries,
produces a downward bias in the estimates of the skill-bias as well as of the
elasticity of factor substitution.
In order to isolate the effect of technical progress on factor shares, one
needs to control for changes in factor prices and capital intensity: the rise
in the share of skilled workers within firms may be simply due to a fall in
their relative factor prices or to capital deepening when skills and capital
are complement. Following the literature (see Binswanger, 1974) we there-
fore define technical progress as a reduction in unit cost (an inward shift of
the unit-isoquant) at constant factor prices and capital intensity. Technical
progress is neutral if, despite lower unit costs, firms on average do not change
factor proportions, at given factor prices and capital intensity. However, if
they increase on average the proportion of skilled workers in employment
(when they pick a new tangency point on an lower isocost line of the same
slope), then technical progress raises the relative productivity of non-manual
workers and is defined skill biased.
Empirically, we implement this approach following Berman et al. (1994),
and Brown and Christensen (1981). An equation for the wage bill share can
be derived from a translog cost function with quasi-fixed factors of produc-
tion. Assume that firms choose variable factors, manual and non manual
labor, in order to minimize costs, subject to an output constraint. Produc-
tion requires (manual and non-manual) labor and capital, which is fixed in
the short run. The cost function has the translog functional form, and re-
turns to scale are constant. Under these assumptions the change in the share
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of non-manuals in the wage bill can be written as follows:
∆(
WBin
WBi
) = α + β ∆ ln(
win
wim
) + γ ∆ ln(
Ki
Y i
) + εi (6)
where Ki and Yi represent capital and value added, respectively (the actual
specification also includes a set of industry, size and geographic dummies, as
in (5)). Note that the intercept α measures of the average bias in technical
change, and the residual εi provides an estimate of the firm-specific bias. If
the slope coefficient β is positive (negative) a change in relative price of a fac-
tor raises (lowers) its cost share, implying that the elasticity of substitution
between inputs is below (above) unity (σ = −β+sn(1−sn)
sn(1−sn)
, where sn =
WBn
WB
).
A positive (negative) estimate for γ implies that capital is complement (sub-
stitute) to non-manual labor, since it raises (lowers) its wage bill share at
constant factor prices. In the following we present results obtained estimat-
ing the above equation using either annual or hourly wages (w = W, ω) as
explanatory variable.
Table 7 reports OLS estimation results using annual wages. We estimate
equation (6) in its basic version , and subsequently add, either individually
or jointly, the two indicators of technological change described above (com-
puters as a share of total investment and R&D over sales). Starting from the
basic specification, we see that the constant is positive and significant: the
increase in the relative productivity of non manual workers (the bias of tech-
nical progress) occurs at an annual rate of 0.48 and thus raises the wage bill
share of skilled workers by almost half of a percentage point per year. The
change in relative wages have a positive and statistically significant coeffi-
cient, implying an elasticity of substitution between labor inputs of σ = 0.49.
The coefficient of the capital-value added ratio is also positive and signifi-
cant, indicating complementarity between capital and skilled labor. Capital
deepening has thus contributed to skill upgrading. When we add to the basic
model technology indicators individually (equations 2-3) or jointly (equation
4), both the computer share of total investment and R&D expenditures as a
fraction of sales have positive and highly statistically significant coefficients.
The estimate of the skill bias falls slightly (to 0.44) when explicit proxies of
technical progress are included in the equation, while the estimated elasticity
of substitution is remarkably stable across different specifications.26
26The results are also robusts to the use of beginning-of-period levels for the technology
indicators.
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Next we re-estimate the previous equation with hourly wages on the right
hand side, and obtain the results shown of Table 8. Compared with those
in Table 7, the parameters for capital deepening and the computer share in
investment are virtually unchanged, while the estimates for the ratio of R&D
expenditures over sales are more precisely estimated and almost double in
size. Moving to hourly wages has two more important consequences: the
estimated skill-bias rises consistently in all specifications, respectively from
α in the range (0.48, 0.44) to α′ in the range (0.52-0.48). Similarly, the
estimated elasticity of substitution rises from σ = 0.49 to σ ′ = 0.67. The
reason for the larger estimated skill bias is the following: technical progress
raises, as we saw, the relative number of non-manual hours, but when wages
are incorrectly measured (on an annual, rather than hourly basis), this effect
is attributed to higher relative factor prices, rather than to the bias. As
for the larger elasticity of substitution, note that in the second specification
this elasticity effectively measures the change in total hours (employment
plus average hours) induced by a change in relative factor prices, so that the
estimated elasticity must also be larger As long as technical innovation and
skilled hours are complement, previous estimates of the skill-bias (and of the
elasticity of substitution), e.g. Berman et al., 1994, Berman et al., 1998, are
therefore likely to be biased downwards.
Summing up, our estimate suggests that skill-biased technological change
has raised the relative productivity of non manual workers an annual rate
of roughly half of a percentage point, and thus was the key determinant of
the increase in the demand for non-manual workers in Italian manufacturing
during the 1990s. We also found that in order to assess the role of technical
progress on wage inequality and skill upgrading, it is important to disaggre-
gate annual wage rates into the number of hours worked and their hourly
price. The current practice in the literature fails to do so, and therefore
erroneously attributes changes in hours to factor prices rather than quanti-
ties. This produces a downward bias in the estimated skill-bias of technical
progress.
8 Discussion and conclusions
This paper has presented firm-level evidence on the dynamics of wage premia
and relative employment and hours in Italian manufacturing in the nineties.
We have exploited a brand new data set, previously unavailable for research,
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that covers a balanced panel of 8441 manufacturing firms between 1989 and
1995. The analysis has reached a number of interesting results on the effects
of technology and trade on employment and wages in Italian manufacturing
firms.
First, Italian firms have substituted unskilled for skilled workers at a rate
comparable to those experienced in other industrialized countries, with high-
tech firms playing a leading role in this process (within-firm skill upgrading is
the main determinant of the shift in relative labor demand in the nineties).
This result is a new, and somewhat unexpected, result, given that most
studies on European economies find significant effect of technical progress at
sector level only after 1995 (e.g. Daveri, 2000).
By contrast, demand changes associated to trade have moved employ-
ment away from skill-intensive firms, contributing to moderate the change
in relative factor prices (between-firm employment shifts has reduced the rel-
ative demand for skills). This finding is consistent with results in Manasse
et al (2002), and is probably due to the anomalous specialization pattern of
Italian trade. During the nineties firms has become increasingly specialized
in unskilled-intensive “traditional” goods (such as shoes, textiles, furniture
etc., see Chiarlone, 2001).
Second, the relative stability of wage differentials within firms hides an
important composition effect: the relative number of hours worked by skilled
workers has risen whereas relative hourly wages have fallen. The narrowing
of hourly skill premia in the face of technical progress may come unexpected,
particularly to readers unfamiliar with the features of the Italian labor mar-
ket. Yet it is well known the Italian centralized system of wage bargaining
systematically fails to tailor wages to firms and workers productivity, with
unions acting as a powerful instrument of wage equalization. For example,
salaries in the South are equalized to salaries in the North, despite large pro-
ductivity gaps, and this is generally regarded as an explanation of a rate of
unemployment which is four times larger in the South than in the North. In
addition, possibly as a result of this compression in relative hourly wages,Italy
has been exporting college graduates and skilled workers (“the brain drain”)
at a rate that has no comparison in Europe (see Becker, Ichino and Peri
(2002))
Third, within-firm skill upgrading, measured by changes in both relative
employment and number of hours, is strongly and significantly related to
investment in computers and R&D).
Fourth, technical progress has raised the relative productivity of non
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manual-worker at an annual rate of half a percentage point, and therefore the
skill bias has been a key determinant of the increase in the relative demand
for non-manual workers in Italian manufacturing in the last decade.
Finally, the paper makes an important methodological point: in order to
assess the role of technical progress on wage inequality and skill upgrading,
it is essential to disaggregate hours worked from their price. Failing to do so,
and attributing hours to factor prices rather than quantities, biases downward
the estimates of the skill bias whenever technical progress and hours are
complement.
Whether these results extend beyond the manufacturing sector is one of
the questions to be investigated in further research.
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9 Appendix
This appendix provides some details on the derivation of the contributions
of employment, hours worked and hourly wages to the wage bill presented in
section 5:
∆
(
WBn
WB
)
= ∆
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i
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Ein
E
W in
W
)
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I∑
i
[
∆
(
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E
)(
W in
W
)
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(
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)(
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E
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The first, second and third line above correspond to the first, second and
third term of equation (4) in the text
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Table 1: Employment and wages: overall and sub-sample averages
Sample WBn
WB
Wn
W
En
E
Wn W En E N.Obs.
Overall 43.3 135.9 31.8 68.2 50.2 43.3 136.0 59087
1989 40.8 135.1 30.2 55.1 40.8 41.6 137.8 8441
1990 41.7 134.8 30.9 59.4 44.1 43.4 140.4 8441
1991 42.5 135.3 31.4 65.3 48.2 44.1 140.4 8441
1992 43.8 136.2 32.1 69.9 51.3 43.6 135.7 8441
1993 44.4 135.5 32.8 71.8 53.0 43.4 132.4 8441
1994 44.5 135.1 32.9 75.3 55.8 43.6 132.2 8441
1995 44.3 135.9 32.6 79.8 58.7 43.4 133.2 8441
Small 25.8 128.5 20.1 51.6 40.2 4.5 22.2 7969
Medium 31.7 134.7 23.5 58.3 43.3 11.5 48.8 37238
Large 46.5 134.2 34.7 70.5 52.5 150.9 435.3 13880
North 43.4 135.4 32.0 68.5 50.6 43.1 134.5 47438
Centre 44.1 136.4 32.4 68.3 50.1 48.1 148.7 9015
South 36.0 140.2 25.7 58.7 41.9 30.7 119.5 2634
High exp. 43.1 135.9 31.8 67.9 50.0 49.9 157.1 29540
Low exp. 43.4 136.0 31.9 68.6 50.4 36.7 114.9 29547
High tech. 47.6 134.7 35.3 68.2 50.6 55.0 155.8 29526
Low tech. 37.4 137.6 27.2 68.2 49.5 31.6 116.2 29561
Note: WBn
WB
= non-manual wage bill share; Wn
W
= skill premium; En
E
= skill
intensity; W = average wage; Wn = non-manual wage; E = employment;
En = non-manual employment. See section 3 for sub-sample definitions.
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Table 2: Employment and wages: sub-sample averages by size
Sample WBn
WB
Wn
W
En
E
Wn W En E N.Obs.
Small
High exp. 28.9 126.2 22.9 51.5 40.8 5.1 22.4 3006
Low exp. 23.9 130.0 18.4 51.8 39.8 4.1 22.1 4963
High tech. 29.8 126.7 23.6 51.9 41.0 5.2 22.2 3497
Low tech. 22.6 129.8 17.4 51.4 39.6 3.9 22.2 4472
Medium
High exp. 34.0 133.1 25.5 58.7 44.1 13.0 50.8 18226
Low exp. 29.2 136.1 21.5 57.7 42.4 10.1 46.9 19012
High tech. 35.7 132.9 26.9 58.2 43.8 13.3 49.6 18336
Low tech. 27.6 136.5 20.2 58.3 42.7 9.7 48.1 18902
Large
High exp. 45.3 135.3 33.5 69.9 51.6 147.1 439.1 8308
Low exp. 48.2 132.3 36.4 71.3 53.9 156.6 429.7 5572
High tech. 50.3 133.6 37.7 70.2 52.6 177.0 469.7 7693
Low tech. 40.8 135.3 30.2 71.0 52.5 118.4 392.5 6187
Note: WBn
WB
= non-manual share of wage bill; Wn
W
= skill premium; En
E
= skill
intensity; W = average wage; Wn = non-manual wage; E = employment;
En = non-manual employment. See section 3 for sub-sample definitions.
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Table 3: Wage bill share decompositions: overall and by sub-sample
Sample WBtot Etot Wtot Ebet Ewit Wbet Wwit N.Obs.
1989-95 0.58 0.51 0.07 -0.12 0.63 0.06 0.01 8203
89-92 1.00 0.83 0.16 0.12 0.72 0.08 0.09 8205
92-95 0.17 0.20 -0.02 -0.37 0.57 0.06 -0.08 8267
High exp. 0.28 0.22 0.06 -0.11 0.33 0.04 0.03 4168
Low exp. 0.30 0.29 0.01 -0.01 0.30 0.03 -0.02 4035
High tech. 0.29 0.24 0.05 -0.15 0.39 0.05 -0.01 4154
Low tech. 0.29 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.01 0.02 4049
Hexp-Htech 0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.21 0.02 0.01 2273
Hexp-Ltech 0.14 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.12 0.01 0.02 1895
Lexp-Htech 0.15 0.14 0.02 -0.05 0.19 0.03 -0.01 1881
Lexp-Ltech 0.15 0.16 -0.01 0.04 0.12 -0.00 -0.00 2154
Note: WBtot = non-manual share of wage bill, Etot = total employment,
Wtot = total wage, Ebet = empl. between, Ewit = empl. within, Wbet = wage
between, Wwit = wage within. See section 4 for details on the decompositions.
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Table 4: Hours and hourly wages: overall and sub-sample averages
Sample ωn
ω
hn
h
ωn ω hn h N.Obs.
Overall 131.5 103.3 39.6 30.1 1720.6 1665.2 59083
1989 131.2 102.9 32.1 24.4 1718.7 1669.8 8441
1990 130.4 103.3 34.8 26.7 1708.7 1653.4 8440
1991 130.1 104.0 38.1 29.3 1714.6 1648.6 8441
1992 131.9 103.3 40.6 30.8 1723.6 1668.2 8441
1993 130.1 104.1 41.6 32.0 1724.1 1655.6 8439
1994 131.4 102.8 43.8 33.4 1718.8 1671.6 8440
1995 132.4 102.7 46.0 34.7 1736.1 1690.8 8441
High exp. 131.0 103.7 39.4 30.1 1723.7 1661.7 29538
Low exp. 132.3 102.8 39.9 30.2 1716.5 1670.1 29545
High tech. 130.5 103.2 39.9 30.6 1709.2 1656.8 29523
Low tech. 132.5 103.8 39.2 29.5 1740.5 1676.5 29560
Note: ωn = non-manual hourly wage per worker; hn = non-manual
average number of hours worked per employee (see section 5).
Table 5: Hours and hourly wages in wage bill decompositions
Sample WBtot Ewit Ebet Hwit Hbet HWwit HWbet N.Obs.
1989-95 0.58 0.63 -0.12 0.19 -0.00 -0.18 0.06 8203
89-92 1.00 0.74 0.11 0.41 0.04 -0.34 0.04 8204
92-95 0.17 0.57 -0.38 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06 0.16 8267
High exp. 0.28 0.33 -0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.09 0.05 4168
Low exp. 0.30 0.30 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.09 0.01 4035
High tech. 0.29 0.39 -0.15 0.14 -0.00 -0.15 0.06 4154
Low tech. 0.29 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.00 -0.03 0.00 4049
Note: WBtot = non-manual wage bill share, Ewit = Employment within,
Ebet = Employment between, Hwit = Hours within, Hbet = Hours between,
HWwit = Hourly wage within, HWbet = Hourly wage between.
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Table 6: Determinants of wage bill components
Dep. Var. ∆lS ICI RDS R2 N.Obs.
WBwit -0.02 0.07 0.09 0.04 7377
( -1.24) ( 2.09) ( 1.29)
WBbet 0.72 -0.20 0.12 0.04 7377
( 9.91) ( -1.37) ( 0.46)
Ewit -0.04 0.08 0.12 0.03 7377
( -1.69) ( 2.04) ( 1.34)
Ebet 0.62 -0.19 0.23 0.04 7377
( 10.07) ( -1.50) ( 0.92)
Wwit 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 7377
( 0.94) ( -0.79) ( -0.71)
Wbet 0.10 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 7377
( 3.98) ( -0.35) ( -0.69)
Hwit -0.02 0.02 0.34 0.00 7377
( -1.87) ( 0.64) ( 3.78)
Hbet 0.11 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 7377
( 3.52) ( -1.23) ( -0.17)
HWwit 0.03 -0.03 -0.37 0.01 7377
( 2.22) ( -1.02) ( -3.87)
HWbet -0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.00 7377
( -0.50) ( 1.41) ( -1.43)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. All specifications include size,
geography and industry sector dummies, as defined in section 3.
Legend: ∆lS = growth rate of sales; ICI = Computer share
of total investment; RDS = R&D / sales.
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Table 7: Determinants of within firm skill upgrading
Equation α ∆lWnm ∆lKY ICI RDS R2 N.Obs.
(1) 0.48 0.11 0.34 0.23 8136
( 31.21) ( 32.51) ( 2.10)
(2) 0.43 0.11 0.36 0.56 0.24 7742
( 24.84) ( 32.32) ( 2.22) ( 5.91)
(3) 0.49 0.11 0.40 0.52 0.24 7684
( 30.87) ( 31.89) ( 2.39) ( 3.36)
(4) 0.44 0.11 0.43 0.58 0.51 0.25 7321
( 24.53) ( 31.82) ( 2.52) ( 5.94) ( 3.62)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable: ∆wbsh = change in log relative
wage bill; ∆lWnm = change in log relative annual wage; ∆lKY = change in log capital
output ratio; ICI = Computer share of total investment; RDS = R&D / sales.
Table 8: Determinants of within firm skill upgrading (hourly wages)
Equation α ∆lHWnm ∆lKY ICI RDS R2 N.Obs.
(1) 0.52 0.07 0.46 0.14 8135
( 32.14) ( 20.48) ( 2.71)
(2) 0.47 0.07 0.46 0.59 0.14 7741
( 25.67) ( 19.86) ( 2.66) ( 5.76)
(3) 0.53 0.07 0.50 0.97 0.14 7684
( 31.53) ( 19.98) ( 2.82) ( 5.46)
(4) 0.48 0.07 0.50 0.63 0.97 0.15 7321
( 25.03) ( 19.50) ( 2.77) ( 5.92) ( 5.57)
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Dependent variable: ∆wbsh = change in log relative
wage bill; ∆lHWnm = change in log relative hourly wage; ∆lKY = change in log capital
output ratio; ICI = Computer share of total investment; RDS = R&D / sales.
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